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In Western society ‘‘normal adolescence’’ is understood to be a bio-
logically driven phase characterized by emotional turmoil and irrational
behavior. Despite being discredited within academic literature this dis-
course persists both in formal theory and everyday use. Drawing on
the case of diabetes care, I argue that the discourse of ‘‘normal ado-
lescence’’ derives its power from its value as a vocabulary of motive
through which to navigate the contradictions inherent in the social
order at this stage of the life-course. While helping us to comprehend
sociologically the ecological niche in which ‘‘normal adolescence’’ is
sustained, this analysis raises questions about the persistence of this
discourse for social action.
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INTRODUCTION
In Western society, the lives of young people are widely interpreted through a
discourse of ‘‘normal adolescence.’’ Adolescence is understood to be a biologically
determined universal stage on the path to adulthood (Prout and James 1990)
characterized by emotional turmoil and irrational behavior (Elliot 2010; Watson
2000; Webb, Jones, and Dodd 2001). While there are certain physiological and social
realities that it is impossible to deny, scholarship has demonstrated that what is
seen as ‘‘normal adolescence’’ is socially constructed. Yet empirical studies of young
people and their families reveal that assumptions about ‘‘normal adolescence’’
are highly influential in shaping understanding of this stage of the life-course in
formal theory (Macfarlane 1996) and folk wisdom (Alderson 1996; Elliot 2010). As
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Hacking (2004, 2007) has observed, ‘‘biologizing’’ and ‘‘normalizing’’ are central
engines through which human sciences ‘make up people’, but they are sustained
through their everyday use by ordinary actors. Understanding the persistence of
particular categorizations of human kind therefore requires analysis of the social
ecology which supports them.
Empirical studies of adolescence have shown the boundaries between childhood
and adulthood to be complex, with social expectations of young people and their
parents unclear. Drawing on the case of diabetes care, and symbolic interactionist
analyses of how people account for their behavior, I argue that ‘‘normal adolescence’’
persists because it provides a ‘‘vocabulary of motive’’ (Mills 1940) through which
to negotiate the moral contingencies that characterize the social order at this
stage of the life-course. Through an examination of how mothers talk about their
experiences of supporting their child to live a life with diabetes, I show that their
accounts are oriented to certain behaviors as morally culpable and that they evoke
taken-for-granted assumptions about ‘‘normal adolescence’’ to excuse their child’s
and justify their own actions. ‘‘Normal adolescence’’ can be understood as one
element in a constellation of ideas about ‘a natural lifetime’ that includes childhood
and adulthood and which is oriented to and reflexively constituted through everyday
interaction. While appeals to ‘‘normal adolescence’’ provide sense-making resources
with which to manage the contradictions that shape the transition from childhood
to adulthood, as long as the actions of young people are understood as outside of
individual control rather than as a rational response to a social problem then the
normative order remains unchallenged.
‘‘NORMAL ADOLESCENCE,’’ YOUNG PEOPLE, MOTHERS,
AND DIABETES
The origins of contemporary discourses of ‘‘normal adolescence’’ can be traced
to nineteenth century developmental psychology and in particular the work of
Granville Stanley Hall (1904). Hall established a number of core assumptions that
have been highly influential in understanding this stage of the life-course (Simmons
and Blyth 1988). First, adolescence as a transitional phase is believed to be a universal
experience with its roots in human biology. Second, it is considered to be a period
of ‘‘storm and stress’’ characterized by conflict with parents. Third, it assumes a
‘‘pre-social self’’ which exists within the individual but which must be found and
developed. Fourth, it is seen as a period in which rational thought is not fully formed
(France 2000). Difficulties exist with each of these assumptions. Anthropological and
historical research has demonstrated that what it means to be young varies between
cultures and over historical periods, although recent scholarship indicates such
differences may not be as marked as once believed (O’Day 1994; Pollock 1983). The
characterization of adolescence as a time of emotional turmoil has also been called
into question, with an accumulative body of work revealing the conventionality of
contemporary youth. For example, Gillies, Ribbens-McCarthy, and Holland (2001)
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studied ‘‘ordinary’’ young people and their parents living in a range of circumstances
in the United Kingdom (UK) and found few identified with representations of
the teenage years as particularly difficult. Moreover, anthropologists have shown
that young people in less complex societies make a smooth transition to adulthood
(Evans-Pritchard 1951). Concerns have also been raised about the claim that a
pre-social self evolves into a full-fledged self during adolescence. It is argued
that this overlooks the complexity of identity construction which is not related to
physiological processes but arises out of negotiations between the individual and
wider social context (James 1993; Jenks 1996). Finally, problems exist when ideas
about rationality are explored. The psychological literature on youth assumes that
rationality exists through processes of cognition. However, as Green (1997) has
observed, rationality is a social construct and should be understood as an ideology
rather than as descriptive of systems of thought.
Our ideas about ‘‘normal adolescence’’ may be socially constructed, but empirical
studies of adolescence in the Western world reveal this stage of the life-course
to be characterized by contradictory norms and values (Elliot 2010; Pascoe 2007;
Spencer 2005). Holdsworth and Morgan (2005) describe it as ‘‘liminal state’’ in
which young people and their parents are caught betwixt and between childhood
and adulthood. The legal classifications that can be understood to define adult
responsibility, such as the age at which young people can drink alcohol, earn money,
leave full-time education, smoke cigarettes, join the armed forces, and consent to
sexual relationships are incredibly varied (James, 1986). Expectations for parents
are also uncertain. Defined as a process of letting go (Karp, Holmstrom, and Gray
2004), parents are expected to encourage independence but are still held to account
by society for their child’s behavior.
The experiences of young people with type 1 diabetes and their parents during
the transition from children’s to adult services represent an interesting microcosm
of these tensions. Living a life with diabetes depends on the individual injecting
insulin several times daily or making regular adjustments to the continuous rate of
insulin infusion through a pump-delivery system, monitoring blood glucose levels,
and attending closely to diet and exercise. The complex nature of diabetes self-care
makes it difficult to manage well and most of them require assistance to live a life
unconstrained by the condition (Corbin and Strauss 1988). In line with normative
gender expectations, in childhood this role is typically performed by mothers (Allen
et al. 2011; Williams 2002) but during adolescence approaches to care are designed
to foster independence (Department of Health 2001). As the young person makes
this transition, medical consultations become progressively focused on the young
person rather than the parent and health professionals increasingly treat young
people as theoretic actors; that is, capable of rational thought and able to choose
between alternative courses of action (Silverman 1987). Once the young person has
been defined as an active decision maker, they gain autonomy at the cost of being
morally responsible for their actions and are accountable when a gap exists between
their knowledge of the parameters of good management and actual behaviors. As
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Williams (2002) has observed, this process places mothers in a no-win situation. On
the one hand, they are expected to support their child’s progression to independent
management and are perceived as over-protective if they do not. On the other hand,
they feel responsible for their children’s behavior when things go wrong (Ribbens
1994).
MOTIVATIONAL ACCOUNTS
In this paper, I examine how mothers talk about their experiences of supporting a
child to live a life with diabetes showing how they appeal to ‘‘normal adolescence’’ to
account for behaviors that fall short of the recommendations of health professionals.
As such, this paper builds on a longstanding interest in symbolic interactionism,
arising from the pragmatism of Dewey (1922) and Burke (1935), with how actors
legitimize their behavior and manage identity (see Albas and Albas 2003 for a
comprehensive history). Mills (1940), the first sociologist to elaborate these ideas,
asserted that people draw on a ‘‘vocabulary of motives’’ to answer for their actions
in a contextually appropriate manner. Mills was at pains to stress that vocabularies
of motive follow rather than determine action. Building on these insights, as Albas
and Albas (2003) point out, Scott and Lyman (1968) replaced the term motive with
account to make this relationship clearer. Accounts presuppose that individuals
socially negotiate the meaning of events and can change them by reconfiguring
their underlying meaning. They are born out of the distinctly human capacity to be
blamed, charged, and held responsible (Ja¨rvinen 2001). They are a crucial element in
the social order because they prevent conflicts from arising by discursively managing
gaps between action and expectation.
Studies of accounts have developed along two lines (Davis 2000). They have
been examined as a way to neutralize deviant behavior and respond to challenges of
some kind (Scott and Lyman 1968). Here their function is ‘‘to shore up the timbers
of fractured sociation, to throw bridges between the promised and the performed,
to repair the broken and restore the estranged’’ (Scott and Lyman 1968:46). In
Goffman’s (1971) terms, they are a type of ‘‘remedial work’’ which enables actors
to manage their self-presentation and ‘‘maintain face.’’ Accounts have also been
examined more generally (Davis 2005), as ‘‘explanatory self narratives’’ that allow
people to ‘‘create and organize meaning’’ as well as define and manage identity
(Davis 2000:35, 38, cited by Estes 2011). Here accounts can be preemptive (Hewitt
and Stokes 1975; Kolb 2011) or anticipatory (Murphy 2004) rather than reactive.
Davis has made the case for drawing together the respective emphases of each
tradition to advance understanding in this field, although in practice there is much
implicit overlap in the approaches that scholars have adopted (see Estes 2011 for an
explicit example).
Considered in these broad terms, the concept of accounts has been widely used to
analyze peoples’ explanations for a variety of behaviors ranging from murder (Ray
and Simmons 1987), sex offenses (Taylor 1972; Scully and Marolla 1984; Higginson
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1999) and criminality (Harris 2011), through gambling (Rossol 2001; Smith and
Preston 1984), homelessness (Snow and Anderson 1987) and alcoholism (Ja¨rvinen
2001), to student absenteeism (Kalab 1987), legitimating the first tattoo (Irwin
2001), and work conduct (Kolb 2011; Shulman 2000). In the sociology of health and
illness it has been deployed inter alia in the analysis of mothers’ defense of their
infant feeding decisions (Murphy 1999), body builders’ legitimation of steroid use
(Monaghan 2002), the negotiation of risk behaviors by HIV positive people (Rhodes
and Cusick 2002), and management of mobility in arthritis (Rosenfeld and Faircloth
2004). In studies of parenting, it has been used to explore how parents accomplish
moral adequacy (Baruch 1981), account for teen sexuality (Elliot 2010), and respond
to their homosexual sons and lesbian daughters coming out (Fields 2001).
For current purposes, the importance of studying accounts is that they provide
important clues about the culture in which the individual is enmeshed (Taylor 1972).
Accounts are intrinsically social and the utterances that constitute a satisfactory
motive are circumscribed by the situation (Mills 1940). Along with rules and norms
of action for various situations, we learn vocabularies of motive appropriate to
them and, as number of studies have shown, available motivational accounts are
shaped by social positioning (Higginson 1999; Kolb 2011). As Mills (1940) observed,
the different reasons actors offer for their actions are not themselves without
reasons.
DATA AND METHODS
This paper analyses qualitative data generated as part of a realistic evaluation
(Pawson and Tilley 1997) of the transition from child to adult diabetes services in
the UK (Allen et al. 2012). The study was designed to ascertain what works best to
support transition, for whom and in what circumstances. Five service models were
purposively selected to reflect the spectrum of provision and longitudinal case studies
of young people with type 1 diabetes undergoing transition were undertaken in each.
Potential cases were identified by appropriately placed healthcare professionals
and a purposive sample selected. The sampling strategy was designed to ensure
representation across the full transition process and was stratified by gender. Once
the young people had agreed to take part, they were asked to identify their principal
carer and all identified their mother as fulfilling this role (Table 1).
Interviews with young people and their mothers were undertaken at three
time points over 12–18 months. The first and third were face-to-face and lasted
approximately an hour and the second was by telephone and lasted approximately
30 minutes. Face-to-face interviews were carried out mainly in the young person’s
home, with a minority undertaken in alternative venues such as cafes. Most were
carried out separately and in private; although in a small number of cases at the
request of the family the young person or parent was present at the time of the other
party’s interview. National Health Service Research and Development Office and
Research Ethics Committee approvals were received. Interviews were transcribed
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TABLE 1. Case Study Participants
Transition Service Females Males Carers
Service 1 1 4 5
Service 2 2 5 6
Service 3 5 4 7
Service 4 8 3 10
Service 5 7 7 11
Total 23 23 39
in full and edited to remove identifying materials. Analysis was supported by the
use of computerized qualitative data analysis software: Altas/ti.
In this paper, I draw on the 117 interviews undertaken with the 39 mothers
participating in the study. These explored mothers’ experiences of caring for a child
with diabetes, perceptions of the service, the process of negotiating independence
and significant life-course events. In the original study interviews were treated as a
resource from which to evaluate approaches to transition. This analysis revealed that
mothers frequently appealed to ideas about ‘‘normal adolescence’’ in their sense-
making. In this paper, the interviews are treated as a topic in which these references
to ‘‘normal adolescence’’ are scrutinized in greater detail for the interactional work
they perform and for what they reveal about the social order.
All healthcare practices take place within a moral framework (Parsons 1951)
and there is a perceived need for young people with diabetes and their parents
to show they are doing their best to manage the condition. Moreover, interviews
are ‘‘identity occasions’’ (Holstein and Gubrium 1995) and subjects are working to
produce themselves as competent actors in the eyes of the interviewer. Mothers were
aware that their child and healthcare providers would also be interviewed and that
the young person’s clinical record would be consulted. Therefore, any actions which
deviated from medically prescribed treatment plans would be revealed, precipitating
participants to orient to any perceived misalignment of behavior and expectation and
accommodate this in the course of their interaction with interviewers. In Western
society, mothers are positioned as mediators between their child and others (New and
David 1985) and in describing their experiences of supporting their child’s diabetes
management the mothers in this study were engaged in two kinds of identity work:
management of their self-presentation and management of the presentation of their
child.
Scott and Lyman (1968) identify two kinds of accounts: excuses and justifications.
To offer an excuse is to appeal to approved vocabularies for relieving responsibility
when it is perceived that conduct may be questioned. To offer a justification is to give
an account in which responsibility is accepted for the act in question, but the negative
qualities associated with it are denied. In the second part of this paper, I wish to show
how mothers’ accounts of parenting a young person with diabetes are oriented to
certain behaviors as morally culpable and appeal to ‘‘normal adolescence’’ to excuse
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their child’s and justify their own actions. In this context ‘‘normal adolescence’’ can
be understood as a vocabulary of motive (Mills 1940) through which social conduct
can be interpreted and which can be deployed as an exculpatory resource in making
sense of behaviors and managing identity at this stage of the life-course.
JUST A TYPICAL TEENAGER
References to ‘‘normal adolescence’’ were a predominant feature of mothers’
accounts.
[B]eing an adolescent anyway without diabetes is really difficult, they go through
that phase they’re not very communicative [ . . . ] they don’t want to share things,
you might say something and that’s it they go defensive.
[1-M148]
[S]he can be a quite stroppy teenager at the moment so we have the usual
conflicts.
[5-M62]
[T]hrough these teenage years, they’re quite sort of hormonal.
[4-M45]
Common to all these extracts is the assumption that adolescence is a universal
phase characterized by conflict and moodiness caused by hormones. This constel-
lation of attributes is treated as a matter of natural fact, with each mother making
reference to what everyone knows about the life of young people. Indeed, in the
second extract, the mother’s talk moves ineluctably between a description of her own
child’s behavior to that of young people in general: ‘‘we have the usual conflicts.’’
Such ideas were also reinforced by health professionals. The following excerpt is
from a textbook on adolescent medicine.
‘‘Adolescence is the space of life [ . . . ] between childhood and maturity. It is a
time when the body reaches physical perfection but it is also a time when, as
Keats wrote as a 23 year old in Endymion: ‘the soul is in ferment, the character
undecided, the way of life uncertain, the ambition thickset’’’
(Turnberg 1996:iii)
Of course doctors generalize about adolescents from a biased sample insofar as
they mostly see the ones with ‘problems’ but they still get treated as authorities.
[T]hey warned us that a lot of them (young people) do just go completely off the
rails and don’t be surprised if she stops testing and don’t be surprised if.
[5-M63]
[W]e were told that everyone rebels, anyone that you know, is young, they will
have a time of rebellion where they’ll think I can do what I want, I’m going to eat
what I want, you know, I don’t care you know, nothing will happen.
[4-M69]
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So taken for granted was this constellation of ideas about the typical teenager that
it was frequently offered as a proxy for a description of actual health behaviors. For
example, in the following extract, in response to the researcher’s question about her
confidence in her daughter’s self-management, Carol’s mother offers the observation
that ‘‘she’s a teenager basically.’’
R: And what about your confidence in her management and her confidence
in her management?
M: She’s a teenager basically, she’s okay but she’s a bit lax with everything
[ . . . ] she’s doing okay but you know they just, if they think they can get away
with it they will won’t they.
By deploying the notion of the typical teenager as a description of behaviors,
this mother appeals to socially distributed stocks of knowledge about ‘‘normal
adolescence’’ to account for her daughter being ‘‘a bit lax with everything.’’ Drawing
the interviewer into this shared view of what everyone knows about teenagers, she
argues that this laxity is understandable because ‘‘if they think they can get away
with it they will won’t they.’’1 Her daughter’s self-management might be less than
perfect, but this is presented as normal for a young person at this stage of the life-
course. In the extracts below, Heath and Rebecca’s mothers make similar appeals
in explaining the need for continuing involvement in their care and, once again,
move from observations about their child’s behavior to statements about those of
teenagers in general.
Just prompting mainly, obviously for adolescents I think that’s the, time-keeping
on his behalf and things like that.
[4-M91]
I mean we do remind her, now and again we say like you know, how many blood
tests have you done today and I know like you know, as they get older because
she’s like a teenager and [ . . . ] they’re in and out and they do forget, you know.
[4-M69]
Age implies social and moral obligations and it is common to draw on categories
of aging to place people’s identities and interpret their behavior (Atkinson 1980;
Hockey and James 2003). Of significance for current purposes is the observation
that the corporeality of aging renders it ripe for biological determinism. As an
explanation of human behavior, biologizing has been a regular focus of sociological
critiques, but here it is deployed as an exculpatory resource. In appealing to their
child’s status as a teenager to account for suboptimal health behaviors, mothers
offered a category of excuse Scott and Lyman (1968) call fatalistic forces. Scott and
Lyman argue that in various cultures fatalistic forces are considered to control some
or all events and that biological drives are among the fatalistic items most likely to
be evoked, with the body and its physiology attributed with influencing behaviors
for which actors may wish to relieve themselves of responsibility. In this context,
‘‘normal adolescence’’ provides a socially acceptable excuse with which to account
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for the gap between medically-determined treatment plans and the young person’s
actual behaviors. They also enable mothers to do another kind of identity work in
circumstances in which concealment was not possible. By acknowledging the short-
comings of their child’s self-management practices mothers are simultaneously
establishing themselves as knowledgeable actors who have an awareness of the
recommendations of health professionals thereby demonstrating their own moral
credibility (Baruch 1981).
Appeals to ‘‘normal adolescence’’ also provide mothers with access to another
mechanism for neutralizing blame: defeasibility. Defeasibility is a category of excuse
that addresses the widespread view that all action entails a theoretic element. Thus
untoward actions can be rebutted on the grounds that an actor was not fully informed
or that their will was not completely free. Young people with diabetes and their
families receive volumes of information about management of the condition so there
is little scope to claim that poor management arises from faulty knowledge. However,
in addition to appealing to their biology, discourses of ‘‘normal adolescence’’ also
enable mothers to evoke common stocks of knowledge about the forces of peer
pressure at this stage of the life-course. Here their accounts portray the young
person as more acted upon than acting. In the following extract Hayley’s mother is
recounting her daughter’s several admissions to hospital since the last interview.
Yes she’s been in hospital a couple of times, mainly I think caused by drinking,
not excessively but I think she’s at the age where a lot of the teenagers who want
to be, as Hayley put it, ‘‘normal.’’
[1-M82]
In this case, the hospital admissions were all alcohol-related, but in accounting for
Hayley’s behavior her mother emphasizes that she was not doing anything different
from any other normal teenager and so should not be condemned for behaving like
her peers. Alex’s mother marshals a similar claim in describing her son having tried
alcohol.
I mean he doesn’t drink, I think he’s tried things but more because of peer
pressure and I think he’s decided not to you know, I know he shouldn’t be but
they do and he’s decided not to.
[5-M41]
As before, an interesting feature of both these extracts is the interactional work
undertaken by mothers to distance themselves from their child’s behavior and
display their own moral credibility, revealing the dual identity work that is being
accomplished in these accounts. In the first extract ‘normal’ is put into reported
speech by Hayley’s mother suggesting that although her daughter may be drinking,
her mother does not endorse this view. Alex’s mother also explicitly observes that
she knows he should not be drinking.
Such appeals derive their power from the positive social value accorded to being
ordinary in Western society (Sacks 1985). Diabetes management, like other chronic
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conditions, is framed within discourses of normalization, with young people and
their families encouraged by health professionals to live a life un-constrained by the
condition. In descriptions of their experiences of coping with diabetes throughout
childhood only a small number of respondents referred to curtailing their activities;
more often, both young people and mothers offered examples of events in which they
had participated unencumbered by the condition. These were typically described
in some detail as celebratory tales that illustrated the family’s success in adapting
to the diagnosis. When young people enter adolescence, however, this emphasis on
normalization creates strains because the social world of teenagers is presumed by
health professionals to be fundamentally hazardous (Macfarlane 1996). By evoking
their child’s normality or typicality in their accounts of their behavior, mothers can
manage these tensions by drawing on the positive aspects of one element (normality)
to diffuse the potential damage to self associated with the other (risk behaviors).
There are parallels here with Estes’ (2011) analysis of mothers’ and fathers’ man-
agement of the student-parent dilemma in higher education in which respondents
joined their identities as students and parents by describing their education as
beneficial to their children and their children as advantageous to their education.
These accounts ‘‘neutralize negative evaluations’’ related to combining parenthood
and higher education, serving to defend their identities as parents and students.
A further indicator of the dominance of the discourse of ‘‘normal adolescence’’
is that behaviors not in alignment with societal expectations of youth were also
accountable. Mothers of young people not perceived to lead full social lives or who
had chosen not to experiment with so-called risk behaviors, were moved to explain
this ‘abnormal’ behavior. In the following extract, Alex’s mother describes her son
as sensible relative to his friends but is at pains to stress that he accomplishes this
without being ‘‘geeky’’ and ‘‘boring.’’
I actually think Alex is quite a sensible boy and whether it’s because of his
diabetes I don’t know but compared with some of his other friends he’s actually,
what he says about things like what teenagers get up to, he’s very much not like
that and although he wants to be with them and everything, things like trying
alcohol and things like that, he’s quite vehemently against and manages to be not
one of the geeky boring people but kind of blends in with them.
[5-M41]
Similarly, in explaining that her daughter does not go out much in the following
extract, the mother emphasizes that this is because ‘‘a great big party scene’’ does
not exist. Of particular interest is her repair in the third line of this extract in which
she appears to be about to attribute her daughter’s lack of partying to personal
qualities (‘‘I mean she is not’’) and redirects her account to external causes: ‘‘there’s
not this great big party scene.’’
I mean generally speaking she’s not a teenager that goes out that much, like I say
she goes out with her friends into town and they’re always going to Starbucks but
I mean she’s not, there’s not this great big party scene or anything.
[4-C52]
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MORALLY ADEQUATE MOTHERHOOD
Having examined how ‘‘normal adolescence’’ enables mothers to excuse their child’s
suboptimal self-management, I wish now to consider how they account for their
own behaviors. Whereas discourses of ‘‘normal adolescence’’ are called upon to
excuse the health behaviors of their children; mothers made similar appeals in
order to justify their own actions. Like excuses, justifications are socially approved
vocabularies that neutralize an act or its consequences when these are called into
question. However, as Scott and Lyman (1968) argue, there is a crucial difference.
To justify an act is to assert its positive value in the face of a claim to the contrary.
Justifications recognize that the act in question was not permissible, but claim that
the circumstances allow for it. The neutralization technique most evident in mothers’
accounts was an appeal to the idea that adolescence can be a time of storm and stress
and that parental support for the young person’s diabetes management has to be
balanced against the risks that too much interference may cause them to rebel and
disengage entirely. This was evoked by mothers who were accounting for occasions
in which they perceived that they could be accused of acting irresponsibly by not
managing their child sufficiently. In the following extract, the mother is talking about
a common problem: encouraging young people to take regular measurements of
blood glucose levels. Here she describes at some length the demands of this process
and the challenges of sustaining this in the context of family life. It is clear, however,
that she considers that such practical considerations might be seen as insufficient
grounds for any perceived deficiencies on her part; hence her ultimate justification
is that excessive interference might lead her child to rebel.
[The doctor] doesn’t take any crap from me, or from her, you know, he will say
yes, yes, if I say well we asked her to do a reading but she didn’t do a reading,
well, you know, thinking where’s the parental control, you make sure that they
do the reading. And he’s right but it’s not always that easy so you know that she
needs to do a reading in the morning and a reading at lunch and a reading at tea
time and a reading before she goes to bed or something and you might have had
one day and say you’ve done it in a morning and she’s felt okay and you know
they’ve got enough finger pricks in their hands and you think oh yes she’s looked
okay and you go a bit by how many times she goes to the loo ((washroom)) and
everything else but you might be doing something else as well or you’ve got to
take one to an evening thing, got to pick the other one up, and you think oh yes
she’s alright, well do your finger prick, oh I’m alright but you don’t do it and so
then when you go and they say oh she’s actually not done her readings all the
time and you’re thinking oh I suppose I should be a bit stricter. But you don’t
want them to rebel.
[4-M41]
Kate’s mother makes a similar kind of appeal to account for her claim that when
food goes missing in the family home she does not make an issue of it.
On the whole she manages really well [ . . . ] but sometimes she can be a bit
rebellious and secretive, you know, there are packets of things that go missing
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that nobody’s had until they turn up under Kate’s bed or something and I don’t
generally make too much of it, I nag a bit but I don’t make too much of it because
I think at her age, if we make it a real issue, she’ll be even more determined to
do it.
[4-M45]
In both these excerpts, mothers build a case that they are permitting a lesser evil
in order to ensure their child’s continued engagement with their self-management.
Here ‘‘normal adolescence’’ furnishes mothers with a neutralization technique, not
previously identified in the literature, that I will call ‘‘an appeal to higher order
values.’’ In such instances the actor asserts that their action was permissible or
even right since it served the interests of an over-riding value. In the examples
considered here, mothers account for their behaviors by reference to concern
for their relationship with their child and ensuring they remain engaged with
the management of their condition. As such they are evoking socially distributed
knowledge about adolescence being a time of emotional turmoil and, in the context
of diabetes care, recognition of the risk of young people disengaging from the service
(Department of Health 2001). Such appeals also orient to ‘‘normal adolescence’’ as
a transient developmental stage in which a suboptimal situation may be temporarily
tolerated.
BRACKETING THE PRESENT AND CONSTITUTING
FUTURES
The mothers in this study regarded independence to be a positive social value, and
acknowledged that achieving this should be an incremental process of handing over
responsibility for diabetes care (Williams 2002). However, they also described this
process as difficult, particularly if they perceived their child was not managing the
condition as well as when it was under greater parental control. Many described the
need to adjust to their reduced role and pointed to the re-alignment of responsibilities
that this entailed (Allen et al. 2011). Accounts displace lived experience to some
extent, but this should not distract from their existential basis (Rhodes and Cusick
2002). Beyond their function in the interactional management of untoward behaviors,
discourses of ‘‘normal adolescence’’ also facilitate the bracketing off of difficulties in
the present, while simultaneously constituting a more positive future. As Sykes and
Matza (1957) observe, techniques of neutralization may be insufficient to shield the
individual from the impact of internalized values and many mothers expressed fear
and concern about the long-term consequences of their child’s failure to manage
their condition. In this context, ‘‘normal adolescence’’ furnishes an additional sense-
making resource which further explains its ubiquity: the belief that adolescence is
a transient phase. A recurrent feature of mothers’ accounts of current difficulties
was their representation as a temporary state of affairs from which their child would
eventually emerge.
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You’re watching your own child destroy all the good work you’ve done basically
and I guess I just try and remain optimistic that he will come out the other side
and get back on track again.
[4-M16]
[H]opefully there will come a point when [ . . . ] he’s a bit more sensible about it.
[3-M93]
Because I think with the lifestyle that he’s got at the moment he’s not doing the
diabetes any good but I think that he’s at a moment in his life and I think he will
come out the other end.
[3-M94]
If present difficulties can be accounted for by recourse to ‘‘normal adolescence,’’
they leave in play a more optimistic future in which the fatalistic forces of biology
will abate and responsible adult behavior adopted. We can see here evidence of
the notion of a pre-social self prevalent in psychological models which assume
adolescence to be a period during which the self is in the making and adult identities
are being formed. Behaviors which fall short of the rational action considered the
hallmark of adulthood can be bracketed off and excused as an expression of ‘‘normal
adolescence’’ and outside the control of their child thereby neutralizing threats to
self. There are clear parallels here with Harris’ (2011) study of the identity work
undertaken by offenders in which their accounts provide a way for people to distance
themselves from their past in an attempt to re-create a possible future self.
UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL ECOLOGY WHICH SUSTAINS
‘‘NORMAL ADOLESCENCE’’
Thus far, I have shown how mothers appeal to ‘‘normal adolescence’’ in accounting
for their own and their child’s health behaviors. Understood as a transient stage and
founded on the twin engines of normalizing and biologizing, ‘‘normal adolescence’’
furnishes mothers with a vocabulary of motive through which to excuse the imperfect
health behaviors of young people, demonstrate their own moral adequacy and justify
parental permissiveness in overseeing self-management. I have argued that the case
of transition in diabetes management may be considered a microcosm of this stage
of the life-course in which the boundaries between childhood and adulthood are
uncertain and the expectations for young people and their parents unclear. In the
final part of this paper I want to move beyond the specific case of diabetes to the
status of young people in general and the social ecology through which ‘‘normal
adolescence’’ is sustained. Having identified the interactional work that ‘‘normal
adolescence’’ is being deployed to accomplish, I look backward to consider what
features of the social order this presupposes, the processes through which this
is constructed and the consequences of the dominance of discourses of ‘‘normal
adolescence’’ as motivational accounts for enabling and constraining action.
‘‘Normal adolescence’’ can be understood as one element in a constellation of
ideas about ‘a natural lifetime’ which begins at birth and ends in death and which
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forms part of the basic conceptual equipment through which everyday activities are
organized (Atkinson 1980). Atkinson (1980) argues that in-so-far-as members treat
this ‘natural lifetime’ as a fact, then the sociologist’s task is to locate the practical
reasoning through which this is accomplished and how actors use that version to
reflexively constitute social settings as they conduct their everyday affairs. This
entails the scrutiny of the interactional work through which social actors make
themselves and others observable-reportable as a ‘child’ or an ‘adult’ or as ‘growing
up’. Of interest is how particular ‘lifetime’ categories are selected and used to
decide the sense of actual talk and activities. He argues that actors treat the ‘natural
lifetime’ as a normative order that, in the words of Zimmerman and Pollner, is:
‘‘pre-supposed by members as an enforceable schema of interpretation and guide
to action that is used by members to present themselves in a particular fashion and
witness the talk and conduct of others in stable ways’’ (1972:87). In order for actors
to produce the facticity of a natural lifetime in their talk it is necessary for them
to attach descriptors that are taken to be tied to different stages in the lifetime
schema. Drawing on Sacks’ (1972) notion of membership categorization devices, he
argues that the categories comprising the lifetime collection are: child, adolescent,
and adult. This collection has several properties. First, they are staged—a lifetime
is a unidirectional progression. Any single person can be categorized first as a child,
second as an adolescent, and third as an adult. Second, no person can at any one
point be assigned to more than one category from the lifetime collection. Third,
certain activities which members might treat as tied to any one of these categories
may not be tied to other categories from the lifetime collection. He suggests that
in everyday talk actors orient to particular lifetime categories as ‘staged’ and it is
through this orientation to particular categories as staged in conjunction with their
treatment of particular activities as being tied to particular membership categories
that growing up or failure to do so in a proper manner is made observable.
Atkinson restricts his analysis to the membership categories of ‘child’ and ‘adult’
and falls short of specifying the attributes tied to particular lifetime categories. He
is more concerned with explicating the rules through which the facticity of a natural
lifetime is accomplished. However, observing and reporting are moral activities in
that one has to continuously select descriptors that are hearable as sensible, right
and appropriate and a particular description has an occasioned rightness (Atkinson
1980, Sacks 1985). As Sacks (1985) has put it, ‘doing being ordinary’ takes work and
effort and requires knowledge of what everybody does ordinarily.
In this paper as we have seen, mothers and health professionals treat certain
constellations of attributes as natural facts of ‘‘normal adolescence.’’ Following
Gubrium and Holstein (1990), I suggest that these can be considered as a ‘configu-
ration of concern’ which draw together and convey what everyone knows about the
attributes that characterize this stage of the life-course. A configuration of concern is
a pattern of collective representations (Durkheim 1938) which links sentiments and
ideas so that ‘‘as we borrow one term to describe experience, we are urged to borrow
from the rest.’’ (Gubrium and Holstein 1990: 152). Gubrium and Holstein apply
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this framework to the analysis of family discourse and show how this configuration
tacitly links ‘‘household,’’ ‘‘family,’’ ‘‘privacy,’’ ‘‘house,’’ ‘‘home.’’ These authors
emphasize that the configuration does not inform us how these connections should
be made: ‘‘application is guided by the configuration, not determined by it’’ (1990:153
original emphasis). This, they suggest, enables the family to be talked into diverse
forms in different institutional contexts.
What is striking about the data in this study, however, is the remarkable regularity
with which the young person’s actions are portrayed as outside their control. There
were no instances of untoward behavior accounted for by appeals to different kinds
of vocabulary of motive centered on intentional action. There are parallels here with
the situation of sex offenders described by Taylor (1972). Taylor examined the range
of motivational accounts available to sex offenders, the role of others in determining
which are principally acceptable, the variables which restrict the acceptability of
alternative vocabularies of motive and the significance of alternative vocabularies
for self-conception and future behavior. Ninety-four accounts offered for sexual
deviancy from a range of sources were studied. He reports an overall limited reper-
toire of motivational accounts, with those which pointed to factors outside the control
of the individual as most prevalent and most likely to be considered socially accept-
able. As Taylor observes, Scott and Lyman (1968), unlike Mills (1940), do not concern
themselves with the significance of accounts for action and the differential power
of social institutions to impose a definition on the situation. He argues that other
deviant groups historically accorded similarly limited vocabularies of motive which
evoke external forces have been able to move toward more volitional accounts, but
sex offenders appear to be locked into deterministic formats which always deny their
behavior as a chosen solution to a problem. Adolescents appear to face the same con-
straints. Why should this be? Taylor suggests that in addressing this question atten-
tion should be directed at the benefits that arise for others from this state of affairs.
This takes us toward the heart of the question posed at the outset of this paper about
the features of the ecological niche through which ‘‘normal adolescence’’ is sustained.
As I have argued, our ideas about ‘‘normal adolescence’’ arise from a wider
interpretative schema of a natural lifetime which assumes that there are clear
differences between child (undeveloped), adolescent (partly developed), and
adult (informed, mature, and dependable) (Alderson 1996; Atkinson 1980). This
representation advocates a normative order as much as it conveys particular state
of empirical reality, but this does not undermine its power as a source of social
control. Young people are valued by adult society primarily because they are adults
in the making (Frankenberg 1993) and adulthood is understood as tied to the
attributes of rationality and responsibility. During the transition from childhood to
adulthood, young people and their families must negotiate a range of contradictory
expectations against which actual behaviors will often fall short. Persons adopting
different versions of reality can be treated as doing so legitimately in so far as they
are seeable as either ‘‘children’’ or ‘‘adolescents’’ (Atkinson 1980). In this context
‘‘normal adolescence’’ can be understood as a necessary counterpart to ‘‘normal
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adulthood’’ enabling young people and their families to negotiate this stage of
the life-course in ways which are recognizably ordinary while sustaining the adult
version of the world against which their behaviors are assessed. By projecting
responsible adulthood as the desired end state, discourses of ‘‘normal adolescence,’’
bracket off and contain current troubles whilst upholding the aspiration that future
behavior will fall into alignment with adult definitions of the normative order.
While ‘‘normal adolescence’’ provides an exculpatory resource in accounting for
behaviors unacceptable to adult society, it is not without its social consequences.
Discourses can position people, as well as people positioning themselves, and these
positions can potentially limit their thoughts and actions (Parry et al. 2006). As
long as the behaviors of young people are always accountable by reference to their
biology, they can exist within the dominant social order, but ultimately this remains
unchanged. The dominance of ‘‘normal adolescence’’ means that the focus of con-
cern is directed at the level of the individual rather than to wider social, political, or
economic constraints which might impact on young people’s ability to successfully
negotiate this stage of the life-course. Furthermore, ‘‘normal adolescence’’ has a
self-reinforcing quality. Constituted through the definitional privilege of adulthood,
any challenge to the normative order can be interpreted as evidence of hormonally
driven rebelliousness rather than a legitimate critique thereby preserving the gen-
erational order.2 As Taylor (1972) has observed, once an individual can be allowed
consciousness and can be considered to be making a decision to act in a particular
way, then there is a possibility of revising our world view and for this behavior to be
presented as a reaction to a special problem with social rather than individual origins.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have argued that societal understanding of the lives of young people
is dominated by a discourse of ‘‘normal adolescence.’’ The teenage years may be
marked by certain indisputable biological and social realities, but what is widely
understood as ‘‘normal adolescence’’ is socially constructed. Despite being discred-
ited in the academic literature, ideas about adolescence as a universal biologically
driven phase characterized by emotional turmoil and irrational behavior, prevail both
in formal theory and everyday practice. My purpose here was to understand the eco-
logical niche that sustains them. Taking mothers’ accounts of diabetes management
during adolescence as a case study, this analysis reveals that ‘‘normal adolescence’’
affords a vocabulary of motive with which to navigate the contradictions and tensions
which characterize the social order at this stage of the life-course. Reflexively consti-
tuted through everyday interaction, ‘‘normal adolescence’’ can be understood as one
element in a constellation of ideas about ‘a natural lifetime’ that includes childhood
and adulthood and which forms a cornerstone of our sense of social order. In this
sense then, ‘‘normal adolescence’’ is a necessary complement to ‘normal adulthood’.
Nevertheless, it is also the case that such ideas afford a limited repertoire of motiva-
tional accounts for young people and those who speak for them. This has important
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social consequences; because as long as the behavior of young people is understood
as outside of their control rather than as a rational response to a social problem then
the normative order remains unchallenged and alternative formulations of the issues
are difficult. The corollary of this is societal neglect of the specific needs of this group
and a failure to address social arrangements which impact negatively on their lives.
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NOTES
1. As Ja¨rvinen (2001) has shown, in accepting the accounts offered, interviewers cooperate in
respondents’ identity work.
2. There are parallels here with Field’s study of the destigmatisising identity work of parents of
lesbian women and gay men, which drew on normative understandings of gender, sexuality, and
parenting to normalize their children and normalize themselves, but at the same time reinforced
the gender, sexual, and familial norms that rendered them deviant in the first place.
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